1ST ICEFCI: INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS, FINANCE AND CREATIVE INDUSTRY 2026
PROCEEDING AND CALL FOR PAPER

Entrepreneurial Incentives for Skilled Diaspora Return in Azerbaijan

Fadai Mardanli [1]

1 PhD Student, Azerbaijan State University of Economics (UNEC), Baku, Azerbaijan
ORCID: 0009-0001-4044-8649 - E-mail: Mardanli.Fadai.Mehman.2023@unec.edu.az

ARTICLE INFORMATION

Available online: July, 2026.

KEYWORDS

diaspora, entrepreneurship, migration, reintegration, Azerbaijan

CORRESPONDENCE

E-mail: Mardanli.Fadai.Mehman.2023@unec.edu.az

A B S T R A C T

This study examines whether entrepreneurship-oriented incentives can support the return of skilled Azerbaijani diaspora members. It addresses a policy gap by comparing business start-up support with conventional employment-related incentives. The empirical analysis draws on a cross-sectional survey of 162 Azerbaijani citizens living abroad. Responses were measured on a five-point Likert scale and assessed using descriptive and comparative analysis. The findings show that 30.2% agreed that practical support for establishing a business in Azerbaijan would accelerate their return decision, while 25.9% were neutral and 43.9% disagreed. Entrepreneurial support attracted substantially less endorsement than competitive salaries aligned with qualifications (62.9%), transparent recruitment (58.0%), and faster recognition of foreign qualifications and professional experience (63.6%). These results indicate that business support should not be treated as a universal instrument for diaspora return. It is better understood as a targeted incentive for potential returnees who possess business experience, investment resources, or a credible entrepreneurial plan. The study concludes that Azerbaijan should combine general labour-market reforms with a selective diaspora entrepreneurship package comprising start-up finance, simplified administrative procedures, mentoring, investment guidance, and post-return advisory support. Such policy differentiation can strengthen the economic contribution of return migration by linking human-capital reintegration with new business formation, knowledge transfer, and employment creation.

1. INTRODUCTION

Skilled emigration creates a policy problem that cannot be reduced to the number of people leaving a country. The larger issue is the loss of productive knowledge, professional networks, tax capacity, and future business formation. Return migration may partly reverse these losses because migrants can bring back savings, technical competence, market knowledge, and international contacts. The development effect, however, depends on the conditions under which return occurs. A person who returns to unemployment, regulatory uncertainty, or weak access to finance may not be able to convert experience acquired abroad into productive activity. Return policy therefore concerns the quality of reintegration as much as the volume of return [1], [12], [13].

Entrepreneurship is often presented as the most visible economic channel through which returnees contribute to their country of origin. Earlier research linked the duration of migration and post-return occupational choice, showing that savings and skills accumulated abroad can facilitate self-employment and business creation [2]. Evidence from Albania similarly distinguishes productive entrepreneurship from own-account work undertaken because suitable wage employment is unavailable [3]. This distinction matters. New firms that employ workers, introduce technology, or enter export markets differ fundamentally from survival activities that merely replace unemployment. A policy that counts every self-employed returnee as an entrepreneurial success may therefore overstate its development effect.

Research conducted in different settings gives substantial support to the migration-entrepreneurship link, but it also shows that the relationship is conditional. International migration experience increased entrepreneurial entry in Mexican communities, particularly where migrants had accumulated human and financial resources abroad [7]. Studies of emerging economies find that skilled migrants are comparatively inclined toward entrepreneurial activity and international market orientation, yet necessity-driven business formation remains common when labour markets do not reward qualifications adequately [8]. Returnee entrepreneurship also depends on institutions, local demand, finance, legal certainty, and social networks. Weak reintegration conditions can prevent motivated returnees from establishing sustainable enterprises [9].

Diaspora entrepreneurship adds a transnational dimension. Diaspora members may identify opportunities in their country of origin while retaining commercial links, suppliers, clients, and professional relationships abroad. Their comparative advantage lies not simply in having lived outside the country, but in being able to combine knowledge of the home market with resources embedded in foreign markets [6], [10], [20]. These capacities are especially relevant to digital services and creative industries, where market access, reputation, intellectual assets, and cross-border collaboration may matter more than large physical investments. Yet scholars caution against treating migrants as universal super-entrepreneurs. Many migrants prefer stable employment, and the performance of returnee businesses is strongly shaped by the surrounding economy [5].

Recent policy literature reaches a similar conclusion. Reintegration assistance can support a return decision and improve economic outcomes, but financial grants alone are insufficient. Counselling, skills matching, case management, market assessment, access to services, and coordination with institutions in the country of origin affect whether reintegration is sustainable [12]-[14]. Global diaspora strategies increasingly emphasize knowledge transfer and investment alongside permanent return [15]. This broader view is compatible with the idea of brain circulation: skilled citizens may contribute through temporary projects, remote collaboration, investment, mentoring, or eventual return rather than through a single irreversible relocation decision.

Azerbaijan provides a useful case for examining these issues. Existing research documents outward migration, brain-drain concerns, and strong emigration intentions among younger and dissatisfied citizens [17]-[19]. The country also seeks to diversify economic activity beyond extractive industries, which increases the value of internationally experienced professionals and entrepreneurs. Despite this policy relevance, limited empirical attention has been given to whether business start-up support is actually a leading return incentive for Azerbaijani citizens abroad. Public discussion often assumes that tax concessions, credit, or simplified registration will attract skilled diaspora members. Such measures may appeal to some groups while leaving the preferences of the larger diaspora population unchanged.

The present study evaluates entrepreneurial support against a wider set of return incentives using survey evidence from 162 Azerbaijani citizens living abroad. Its objective is not to estimate a causal effect of a specific programme, since no such programme was experimentally assigned. It asks a narrower and policy-relevant question: how strongly do potential returnees endorse practical support for establishing a business, and how does that endorsement compare with salary, qualification recognition, transparent recruitment, social protection, career assistance, and quality-of-life conditions? Three expectations guide the analysis. First, entrepreneurship support should receive positive endorsement from a meaningful subgroup. Second, employment-related incentives should receive broader support than business start-up assistance. Third, the results should favour a segmented rather than universal diaspora-entrepreneurship policy.

2. METHODS

2.1. Research design and sample

The study uses a quantitative cross-sectional survey designed within a broader investigation of labour migration and employment in Azerbaijan. The target population consisted of Azerbaijani citizens aged 18 or older who were living abroad either temporarily or permanently. The questionnaire was distributed online through Google Forms, social-media channels, and diaspora groups. A total of 162 complete responses were retained for analysis. The sampling procedure was non-probabilistic, so the results describe the surveyed group and should not be interpreted as nationally representative estimates of the entire Azerbaijani diaspora.

The sample is suitable for an exploratory analysis of skilled-diaspora return because it is concentrated among younger and educated respondents. Participants aged 18-34 accounted for 69.8% of the sample, while 66.7% held a bachelor’s degree or a postgraduate qualification. Respondents lived across neighbouring countries, Western and Eastern Europe, North America, and other regions. Employment situations were diverse: 19.8% worked formally full-time, 27.2% worked formally part-time or freelance, 35.8% reported informal work or own-business activity, 5.6% identified as formal entrepreneurs, and 11.7% were studying or seeking work. The combined category of informal employment and own business limits precise identification of entrepreneurial experience, a point considered when interpreting the findings.

2.2. Measures and analytical procedure

Return incentives were measured through eight statements rated on a five-point Likert scale, where 1 represented strong disagreement and 5 represented strong agreement. The items covered competitive salary, clear career-development mechanisms, transparent recruitment, stronger social protection, faster recognition of foreign qualifications and experience, job-placement and career support, practical support for establishing a business, and stable quality of life. The entrepreneurship item asked whether real support for establishing a business in Azerbaijan would accelerate the respondent’s return decision.

The analysis combines frequencies, response shares, weighted mean scores, and a net-agreement index. Positive endorsement is the combined share of responses 4 and 5; disagreement combines responses 1 and 2. The weighted mean was calculated by multiplying each response category by its Likert value and dividing the sum by 162. Net agreement subtracts the disagreement share from the positive share. These measures allow a direct comparison of incentives without claiming interval-level precision beyond the descriptive purpose of the scale. No regression coefficient or significance test is reported for the entrepreneurship item because the available dataset in the present paper is an aggregated survey extract rather than the individual-level response matrix required for multivariate estimation.

Table 1. Profile of survey respondents (N = 162)

Dimension	Category	N	%
Gender	Male	89	54.9
	Female	73	45.1
Age	18-24	52	32.1
	25-34	61	37.7
	35-44	40	24.7
	45 and above	9	5.6
Education	Secondary/vocational	54	33.3
	Bachelor’s degree	71	43.8
	Master’s or higher	37	22.8

Dimension	Category	N	%
Current status abroad	Job-seeking/student	19	11.7
	Informal work/own business	58	35.8
	Formal part-time/freelance	44	27.2
	Formal full-time	32	19.8
	Formal entrepreneur	9	5.6

Source: Author's survey calculations.

The study treats return intention as a stated preference, not observed return behaviour. Survey responses may reflect expectations about hypothetical policy changes and can differ from decisions made under actual financial, family, or legal constraints. Interpretation therefore focuses on the relative ordering of incentives and the design implications of that ordering. The analysis follows a non-causal comparative logic and does not infer that introducing a single incentive would produce an equivalent percentage increase in return migration.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1. Relative strength of return incentives

The comparison produces a clear hierarchy. Faster recognition of foreign qualifications and professional experience received the highest weighted mean, 3.66, and was endorsed by 63.6% of respondents. Competitive salary followed closely, with a mean of 3.64 and 62.9% positive endorsement. Transparent recruitment ranked third at 58.0%. These three items concern the ability of returnees to convert skills into credible employment and income. Their position at the top of the ranking indicates that the surveyed diaspora first evaluates whether the domestic labour market will recognize, reward, and fairly allocate its human capital.

Table 2. Comparative evaluation of return incentives

Rank	Incentive	Agree (%)	Neutral (%)	Disagree (%)	Mean
1	Recognition of foreign qualifications	63.6	17.3	19.1	3.66
2	Competitive salary	62.9	16.7	20.4	3.64
3	Transparent recruitment	58.0	18.5	23.5	3.53
4	Job placement and career support	51.8	21.6	26.5	3.37
5	Stable quality of life	48.8	20.4	30.9	3.23
6	Stronger social protection	46.3	22.8	30.9	3.22
7	Clear career-development mechanisms	42.6	23.5	34.0	3.11
8	Entrepreneurship support	30.2	25.9	43.9	2.77

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey. Means use a five-point Likert scale.



Figure 1. Positive endorsement of return incentives

Source: Author's survey calculations.

Job-placement and career support occupied the middle of the ranking, endorsed by 51.8%. Stable quality of life and stronger social protection received positive shares of 48.8% and 46.3%, respectively. Clear career-development mechanisms were supported by 42.6%. These results do not make social and institutional conditions secondary in an absolute sense. They show that potential returnees view them together with employment prospects. A return package that offers a grant but leaves qualification recognition, recruitment, healthcare, education, and career mobility unresolved may fail to address the wider risk calculation behind relocation.

Entrepreneurship support ranked last. Only 30.2% agreed or strongly agreed that practical support for establishing a business would accelerate their return, while 43.9% disagreed and 25.9% remained neutral. Its weighted mean was 2.77, the only score below the scale midpoint of 3.00. The net-agreement index was negative at -13.7 percentage points. By comparison, qualification recognition produced a positive net agreement of 44.5 points and competitive salary 42.5 points. The gap is too large to describe entrepreneurship assistance as a universal return lever.

3.2. Entrepreneurship support as a selective incentive

The detailed response distribution reinforces the ranking result. Strong disagreement with the entrepreneurship statement was reported by 20.4% of participants and disagreement by 23.5%. Neutral responses formed the largest single category at 25.9%. Partial agreement accounted for 19.1%, while only 11.1% strongly agreed. The distribution is not polarized between two equally large camps. It is tilted toward scepticism, with a sizeable undecided group and a smaller but still policy-relevant supportive segment.

The 30.2% positive share should not be dismissed. Applied to a large diaspora population, a selective group of potential returnee founders can still represent substantial economic capacity. The key issue is targeting. International evidence indicates that productive returnee entrepreneurship is more likely when migrants possess savings, schooling, foreign-language competence, professional experience, and access to networks [3], [7]. In contrast, indiscriminate grants may attract applicants without viable projects or push people into necessity self-employment. The survey result is therefore consistent with research that rejects a uniform image of the migrant entrepreneur [5], [9].

Table 3. Responses to the entrepreneurship-support statement

Response	N	%	Interpretive group
Strongly disagree	33	20.4	Negative
Disagree	38	23.5	Negative
Neutral	42	25.9	Undecided
Agree	31	19.1	Positive
Strongly agree	18	11.1	Positive
Total	162	100.0	

Source: Author's survey calculations.

The neutral group also deserves attention. Neutrality may represent absence of entrepreneurial interest, uncertainty about what support means, or doubt about whether promised assistance would be implemented predictably. A vague policy message such as support will be available is unlikely to change migration decisions. Potential returnees need concrete information on eligible sectors, co-financing requirements, registration, licensing, taxation, intellectual-property protection, access to premises, and post-start-up mentoring. Clarity can convert some neutral respondents into informed applicants while discouraging projects that are not commercially prepared.

3.3. Why employment incentives outrank business start-up support

Four mechanisms help explain the difference. First, wage employment is relevant to a broader population than entrepreneurship. Every skilled returnee needs an income-generating position, but only a subset intends to establish a firm. Second, entrepreneurship transfers a larger share of risk to the individual. Even when finance is available, the returnee must assess demand, regulation, competition, staffing, and the possibility of losing accumulated savings. Third, domestic institutional quality affects both entry and survival. If recruitment is perceived as opaque and qualifications are difficult to recognize, potential founders may infer that licensing, procurement, dispute resolution, or access to networks will also be uncertain. Fourth, family relocation decisions often require stable income, education, healthcare, and housing before business ambitions can be pursued.

The ranking therefore suggests complementarity rather than a simple choice between jobs and entrepreneurship. Recognition of qualifications, transparent rules, and stable public services are not only employment policies. They also form part of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. A founder who returns with a spouse and children needs predictable social conditions; a technology venture needs access to qualified employees; a consulting firm depends on recognition of professional credentials; a creative enterprise needs enforceable contracts and intellectual-property rights. The top-ranked incentives can indirectly raise the effectiveness of business support.

The result also fits the distinction between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship. Productive diaspora ventures are likely to be opportunity-driven, based on a market gap, technology, client network, or professional specialization. Necessity entrepreneurship occurs when returnees cannot obtain suitable employment and create small activities as a fallback. The second form may provide household income but does not automatically generate innovation or skilled employment. Policy should not make self-employment the default reintegration path for people whose primary preference is professional work. That would replace one labour-market mismatch with another.

Azerbaijan's policy objective should consequently be framed as enabling qualified diaspora entrepreneurship, not maximizing the number of returnees registered as individual entrepreneurs. Selection criteria can include relevant business or managerial experience, personal co-investment, evidence of demand, export potential, technological or creative content, and a credible employment plan. Public support can then focus on constraints that private finance does not address adequately, such as information asymmetry, early-stage guarantees, market-entry guidance, and connection to domestic institutions.

3.4. A segmented policy model for Azerbaijan

A segmented policy model follows directly from the evidence. The first layer should be universal and address conditions affecting most potential returnees: transparent recruitment, timely recognition of qualifications, accessible labour-market information, social-protection portability, and stable public services. The second layer should be selective and designed for diaspora members with entrepreneurial capacity. The third layer should retain transnational options for people who are not ready for permanent return but can invest, mentor, export, or manage projects from abroad. Such differentiation avoids spending entrepreneurial funds on beneficiaries who mainly seek employment while preserving several channels for diaspora contribution.

Operational responsibility should not be concentrated in a single institution. A one-stop digital portal can coordinate the Ministry of Economy, labour-market authorities, tax and customs bodies, qualification-recognition agencies, innovation organizations, financial institutions, and the State Committee on Work with Diaspora. The portal should not merely advertise opportunities. It should provide case tracking, sector-specific guidance, transparent eligibility rules, service deadlines, and a mechanism for resolving administrative barriers. The OECD and IOM literature emphasizes coordination and case management because fragmented programmes impose high transaction costs on returnees [12]-[14].

Table 4. Proposed segmented diaspora-return policy framework

Policy layer	Target group	Core instruments	Expected result
Universal reintegration	All potential skilled returnees	Qualification recognition; transparent vacancies; career information; social-security guidance	Lower information and relocation risk
Entrepreneurial screening	Returnees with business experience, capital, or a validated project	Business-plan assessment; sector diagnostics; skills and finance profiling	Identification of credible founders
Venture entry	Selected diaspora entrepreneurs	One-stop registration; matching grants; credit guarantees; tax and licensing guidance	Faster formal market entry
Growth and internationalization	Operating returnee firms	Mentoring; export support; procurement access; diaspora and investor networks	Firm survival, exports, and job creation
Transnational participation	Diaspora members not ready for permanent return	Remote mentoring; temporary projects; co-investment; market representation	Knowledge and capital circulation without forced relocation

Source: Developed by the author from the survey findings and the return-reintegration literature.

Financial assistance should be conditional rather than automatic. Matching grants, credit guarantees, or seed finance can be tied to personal investment, verified milestones, and business-development support. This reduces adverse selection and signals that the programme is intended for viable projects rather than general relocation compensation. Applicants who lack a ready venture can be directed to employment or skills-matching services instead of being pushed into business formation. Post-entry mentoring should continue beyond registration, since the highest risks often emerge during customer acquisition, hiring, taxation, and the transition from an informal network to a formal enterprise.

Creative industries offer a practical field for piloting the selective layer. Azerbaijani professionals abroad may hold experience in software, digital media, design, advertising, film production, architecture, cultural tourism, gaming, education technology, and professional services. These activities can use transnational networks, reach foreign clients, and begin with lower fixed capital than manufacturing. A pilot programme could combine an online accelerator, domestic mentors, export guidance, intellectual-property advice, and competitive co-financing. The programme should still be sector-neutral at the application stage so that promising projects outside creative industries are not excluded.

3.5. Monitoring and evaluation

Programme evaluation should distinguish administrative outputs from economic outcomes. The number of applications, grants, and registered businesses measures activity, not success. A monitoring system should track firm survival at 12, 24, and 36 months; private co-investment; employment created; share of skilled jobs; turnover; exports; tax compliance; participation of women and younger founders; and whether beneficiaries remain economically active in Azerbaijan. It should also record applicants redirected to wage employment, because successful skills matching can be a better outcome than an unsuitable start-up.

A phased pilot would provide stronger evidence than immediate nationwide expansion. Applicants could be admitted in cohorts and followed through a standardized case-management system. Baseline data should include education, occupation, migration duration, host-country employment, savings, business experience, family situation, and intended sector. Subsequent evaluation can then identify which profiles respond to each instrument. The present survey establishes the need for differentiation but cannot determine the causal effect or cost-effectiveness of individual subsidies. A pilot with transparent data collection would address that evidence gap.

Safeguards are also necessary. Support should be based on published criteria, independent assessment, conflict-of-interest rules, and auditable decisions. Without these protections, a programme intended to increase institutional confidence could reproduce the transparency concerns that respondents already identify as a barrier to return. Feedback from unsuccessful applicants and returning entrepreneurs should be published in aggregated form and used to revise service standards.

3.6. Study limitations

Several limitations define the scope of the findings. The online convenience sample may overrepresent respondents who are active in diaspora networks, younger, or comfortable with digital surveys. Stated intentions do not necessarily predict actual return. The survey item refers to real support for establishing a business but does not separate finance, tax relief, registration, mentoring, or market access. Respondents may have interpreted the term differently. The available aggregated data also prevent multivariate analysis of whether entrepreneurs, freelancers, highly educated respondents, or long-term migrants evaluate the incentive differently. Finally, the study measures demand for support rather than the viability of proposed enterprises. These restrictions do not invalidate the ranking, but they mean that policy design should be tested with individual-level data and pilot implementation before large-scale funding is committed.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The survey evidence does not support treating entrepreneurship assistance as a universal mechanism for skilled-diaspora return to Azerbaijan. Practical support for establishing a business was positively endorsed by 30.2% of respondents, while 43.9% disagreed and 25.9% were neutral. Its weighted mean of 2.77 placed it below all seven alternative incentives. Recognition of foreign qualifications, competitive salary, and transparent recruitment received the strongest support. Potential returnees therefore evaluate the domestic labour market and institutional environment before they evaluate the possibility of becoming entrepreneurs.

The finding does not imply that diaspora entrepreneurship lacks value. A supportive share of nearly one-third can contain founders capable of transferring knowledge, capital, networks, and international market access. The policy mistake would be to design a broad grant scheme on the assumption that most skilled migrants wish to run a business. Resources should be directed toward applicants with demonstrated experience, co-investment, market knowledge, and a viable project. Other returnees should receive employment matching, qualification recognition, career support, or opportunities for temporary and remote engagement.

Azerbaijan should combine universal labour-market reforms with a selective diaspora-entrepreneurship package. The universal layer should reduce the risks that affect nearly every return decision. The selective layer should provide coordinated registration, finance, mentoring, export support, and post-entry case management. Transparent criteria and outcome-based monitoring are essential because institutional confidence is part of the return calculation. Creative and digital industries provide a suitable pilot field, but eligibility should remain open to productive projects across sectors.

The central policy implication is differentiation. Return migration, wage employment, entrepreneurship, and transnational contribution are related but distinct pathways. A credible diaspora strategy should allow citizens abroad to move between them rather than forcing all returnees into a single programme. The present results provide a descriptive basis for such segmentation and identify the next empirical task: testing which entrepreneurial instruments work for which migrant profiles and at what public cost.

5. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author received no external funding for this study and thanks the survey participants for their contribution.

6. REFERENCES

[1] J.-P. Cassarino, “Theorising return migration: The conceptual approach to return migrants revisited,” International Journal on Multicultural Societies, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 253–279, 2004.

[2] C. Dustmann and O. Kirchkamp, “The optimal migration duration and activity choice after re-migration,” Journal of Development Economics, vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 351–372, 2002.

[3] M. Piracha and F. Vadean, “Return migration and occupational choice: Evidence from Albania,” World Development, vol. 38, no. 8, pp. 1141–1155, 2010.

[4] R. Hausmann and L. Nedelkoska, “Welcome home in a crisis: Effects of return migration on the non-migrants’ wages and employment,” European Economic Review, vol. 101, pp. 101–132, 2018.

[5] W. Naudé, M. Siegel, and K. Marchand, “Migration, entrepreneurship and development: Critical questions,” IZA Journal of Migration, vol. 6, art. no. 5, 2017.

[6] M. Elo, S. Sandberg, P. Servais, R. Basco, A. Discua Cruz, L. Riddle, and F. Täube, “Advancing the views on migrant and diaspora entrepreneurs in international entrepreneurship,” Journal of International Entrepreneurship, vol. 16, pp. 119–133, 2018.

[7] J. Wassink, “International migration experience and entrepreneurship: Evidence from Mexico,” World Development, vol. 136, art. no. 105077, 2020.

[8] M. Guerrero, V. Mandakovic, M. Apablaza, and V. Arriagada, “Are migrants in/from emerging economies more entrepreneurial than natives?” International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, vol. 17, pp. 527–548, 2021.

[9] Y. Riaño, “Migrant entrepreneurs as agents of development? Geopolitical context and transmobility strategies of Colombian migrants returning from Venezuela,” Journal of International Migration and Integration, vol. 24, suppl. 2, pp. 539–562, 2023.

[10] R. L. Tung, “Brain circulation, diaspora, and international competitiveness,” European Management Journal, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 298–304, 2008.

[11] H. de Haas, “Migration and development: A theoretical perspective,” International Migration Review, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 227–264, 2010.

[12] OECD, Sustainable Reintegration of Returning Migrants: A Better Homecoming. Paris, France: OECD Publishing, 2020.

[13] OECD, Return, Reintegration and Re-migration: Understanding Return Dynamics and the Role of Family and Community. Paris, France: OECD Publishing, 2024.

[14] International Organization for Migration, Reintegration Handbook: Practical Guidance on the Design, Implementation and Monitoring of Reintegration Assistance. Geneva, Switzerland: IOM, 2019.

[15] International Organization for Migration, The Future Agenda of Global Diaspora Engagement. Geneva, Switzerland: IOM, 2024.

[16] World Bank, World Development Report 2023: Migrants, Refugees, and Societies. Washington, DC, USA: World Bank, 2023.

[17] K. Aliyev, A. Ismayilov, I. Gasimov, and A. Isayeva, “Unhappy moves? Assessing the link between life (dis)satisfaction and intention to emigrate from Azerbaijan,” Economics and Sociology, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 127–145, 2021.

[18] S. Gurbanov, “Migration and brain drain: Survey for the Azerbaijan economy,” Journal of Qafqaz University: Economics and Administration, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 3–13, 2014.

[19] S. Hohmann, Labour Migration, Vulnerability, and Social Change in the Southern Caucasus: The Case of Azerbaijan. Paris, France: Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 2016.

[20] A. Saxenian, The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press, 2006.